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RIGHT OF THE PROSECUTION TO ATTACK THE CHARACTER
OF THE DEFENDANT
(A LIMITED RECOGNITION OF A NEW EXCEPTION)
Jerome F. Goldberg
As a general proposition, the right of the prosecution to initially attack
the character of a defendant is not of itself a problem in the law of Evidence.'
The principles of law on this subject are conceded to be well-settled. It is
established law that unless and until a defendant has put his good character
in issue,2 the prosecution may not subject it to attack,3 and then only by show-
ing the general reputation of the defendant for bad character and not by
showing specific instances of misconduct alleged to have been committed by
him.4 Factual situations arise, however, when one questions the sufficiency
and adequacy of these rules.
In Roberson v. State5 the defendant was indicted for murder and convicted
of manslaughter in the first degree. At the trial he interposed a plea of self-
1. As a prerequisite to any understanding of the fundamental principles involved in the
subject of the character of an accused, certain distinctions must be observed. Initially, the
term character should be distinguished from the term reputation, the latter terms being
merely a source or mode of evidencing character. One must also distinguish between the
relevancy of character itself, i.e., the admissibility of character to evidence something else,
and the use of conduct (e.g., specific conduct) to evidence character. A further distinction
is to be noted between the admissibility of character as evidentiary, i.e., to show the doing
or not doing of an act by an individual, or for any other evidentiary purpose (e.g., a de-
ceased's character to show that the defendant was reasonably afraid of an attack by the
deceased), and character as an issue on the pleadings (e.g., the character of a plaintiff in
a defamation action as bearing on a plea of truth or on the assessment of damages). In the
latter, no evidentiary use is made of such character; it merely plays a part in the legal
issues of the case. This note is concerned only with the admissibility of the character of a
defendant as evidentiary. For a general discussion of the above distinctions and the termi-
nology involved, see 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§52, 53, 54 (3rd ed. 1940).
2. A defendant's good character is always admissible in his favor to evidence the improb-
ability of his doing the act charged, even as to misdemeanors: 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§55,
56 (3rd ed. 1940) ; Hawley v. United States, 133 F. 2d 966 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Johnson v.
State, 138 Tex. Cr. 188, 135 S.W. 2d 485 (1940) ; the character or disposition offered,
whether for or against the defendant, must involve the specific trait related to the act
charged: De Angelo v. State, 187 Miss. 84, 192 So. 444 (1939) ; State v. Sbrilli, 136 N.J.
66, 54 A. 2d 221 (1947) (rape; accused's honorable discharge from army and good conduct
medal excluded) ; People v. Kendall, 357 Ill. 448, 192 N.E. 378 (1930) (robbery; accused's
character for truth and veracity excluded) ; 22 C.J.S. §676, p. 1067 and n. 99; MCCORMICK,
CASES ON EVIDENCE pp. 487, 488 (2d ed. 1948).
3. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§57, 58 (3rd ed. 1940); 22 C.J.S. §676, pp. 1068, 1069 and n.
17-20; No such rule prevails under the continental procedure in France: See People v. Shea,
147 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E. 505 (1895); It is a rule of Anglo-Saxon origin which is "firmly and
universally established in policy and tradition." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §57, p. 456 (3rd ed.
1940).
4. 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE §193 (3rd ed. 1940); Jones v. State, 20 Okla. Cir. 154, 201 P.
664 (1921); It is the general reputation in the community in which the defendant resides:
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1610 (3rd ed. 1940).
5. - Okla. Cr. _, 218 P. 2d 414 (1950).
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defense and in support of such plea introduced evidence of the character of
his victim for turbulence and violence,6 both as to the general reputation of
the deceased for such character traits and as to specific acts of violence on the
part of the deceased.7 Thereupon the prosecution, supported by the trial
court's ruling, cross-examined the defendant as to specific acts of violence
alleged to have been committed by him in the past. The prosecution's theory
was that such evidence was competent to prove that the defendant ". . . is a
turbulent, high-tempered man given to seeking trouble. '" ' The trial court
agreed that ". . . since the defendant had elected to open up the question as
to the turbulence of the deceased, that he now likewise is subject to attack by
the State for the sole purpose of showing and bearing upon the question of
who was the aggressor, the defendant having interposed a plea of self-
defense." 9
The prosecution in its rebuttal did not follow up the cross-examination with
proof relative to the matters inquired about on cross-examination.' 0 On
appeal, one judge dissenting, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The majority opinion regarded the cross-examination of the defendant as
a notorious violation of the rule that the character of a defendant may not
be made the subject of inquiry by the prosecution before the defendant
has put it in issue by offering evidence of his good character. Moreover,
the cross-examination of the defendant in relation to specific acts of violence
transcended the requirement that an attack on the defendant's character
when he has invoked the issue must be confined to his general reputation
for bad character, and that there cannot be any resort to particular acts
of misconduct.:"
Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that these rules represent
"the almost universal agreement of the courts," and are "all but universally
6. Where the issue of self-defense is raised on a trial for homicide and there is evi-
dence to support such a plea, the defendant may offer evidence of the character of his
deceased victim for turbulence or violence as bearing on the issue of who was the probable
aggressor; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §63 (3rd ed. 1940) ; see Note, 64- A.L.R. 1029.
7. The mode of evidencing such character is usually confined to the general reputation
of the deceased. Wigmore argues that "there is no substantial reason against evidencing
such character by particular instances of violent or quarrelsome conduct." 1 W MORE,
EVIDENCE §198 (3rd ed. 1940); but the weight of authority is apparently to the contrary;
see Note, 121 A.L.R. 380; However, specific acts of violence on the part of the deceased
known or communicated to the defendant are admissible for the purpose of showing the
defendant's state of mind and whether he acted reasonably under the circumstances: 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§246, 248 (3rd ed. 1940) ; Saunders v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 264, 111 P. 965
(1910) ; Mulkey v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 75, 113 P. 532 (1911) ; Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653,
35 A. 2d 916 (1944).
8. Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 418 (1950).
9. Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 418, 419 (1950).
10. This omission is of considerable importance. It prompted the writer of the majority
opinion in the Roberson case to conclude, after evaluating the conflicting authorities on the
rule in question, that "in any event, this is not a case where the "Missouri rule" can be
invoked. The state did not bring this case within that rule. The "Missouri rule" is not
satisfied by merely asking highly prejudicial questions on cross-examination. If the trial
court desired to invoke the same, the cross-examination should have been followed up with
proof relative to the matters inquired about on cross-examination." Roberson v. State,
- Okla. Cr. , 21S P. 2d 414, 424 (1950).
11. This statement should be qualified in that evidence of similar, specific crimes alleged
to have been committed by a defendant is admissible when independently relevant, subject
to limitations as to its purpose. This aspect is discussed later. See in general, 28 CALIF. L.
REV. 516 (1949); People v. Gray, 154 Cal. 472, 98 P. 194 (1884); People v. Tokoly, 313
Ill. 177, 144 N.E. 808 (1924) ; Carrol v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 30, 58 S.W. 340 (1900).
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applied throughout the nation.'1 2 Even the attorney general in his appeal
brief conceded that ". .. under the law where the defendant has not
made an issue of his reputation in a homicide case, the state may not attack
the same.' '13
The court was, however, confronted with authority to the contrary. In a
similar factual situation the Supreme Court of -Missouri, in State v. Robin-
son,' 4 had held that where the accused brings in issue the bad character of
the victim of his assault to substantiate his plea of self defense, he thereby
opens the door for admission of evidence of his own bad reputation as a violent
and turbulent individual. The majority of the court in the Roberson case
was not willing to follow the Missouri view, feeling that its adoption would
"open the door to confusion and irreparable prejudice, invite the temptation
of abuse, and inescapably raise a variety of issues, divert the attention
of the one immediately before the jury and in many instances, provoke the
conviction of the accused upon general principles instead of on the issues
involved in the particular case."15
The dissenting judge, in a lengthy and carefully reasoned opinion, argued
vigorously for the adoption of the "M1issouri rule" as an exception to the
conventional rule of character exclusion. His search of the authorities
revealed that two other jurisdictions had adopted it,16 others had discussed
and indicated its propriety,17 and no less an authority than Dean Wigmore
favored the rule.18 The dissenting opinion emphasized that ". . . only the
defendant has the key to the door. He may, if he chooses, keep it closed.
Only when he elects to open up the subject of the reputation of the deceased
for violence and turbulence may like inquiry be made as to himself .... "19
The controversy thus resolves itself into an analysis and evaluation of the
conflicting rules.
At the outset one must concede that a defendant's bad character, par-
12. Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. _, 218 P. 2d 414, 416, 417 (1950).
13. Roberson v. State, __ Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 416 (1950).
14. 344 Mo. 1094, 130 S.W. 2d 530 (1939) ; Note, 5 Mo. L. REv. 430 (1940).
15. Roberson v. State, -. Okla. Cr. -, 218 P. 2d 414. 422 (1950).
16. Alabama: Cook v. State, 5 Ala. App. 11, 59 So. 519 (1912) in which case the court
said: "Where the question as to whether the deceased or the defendant in a trial for homi-
cide, was free from fault in bringing on the fatal difficulty, is in doubt, the fact and char-
acter of previous difficulties between the defendant and the deceased may be shown . . .
and the general character of the deceased and the defendant for peace and quiet or for
turbulence and for bloodthirstiness . .. may also be shown." See also Carr v. State, 147
Ark. 524, 227 S.W. 776 (1921), where the court in a dictum stated: "The plea of self-defense
was interposed, so the question as to whether defendant or deceased was the aggressor
became a material issue. The general reputation of each for peace and quiet was therefore
admissible as tending to show who was the probable aggressor." In People's Loan and Inv.
Co. v. Traveller's Ins. Co., 151 F. 2d 437 (8th Cir. 1945), the Arkansas rule is stated to be
". .. that where a question of self-defense is involved, the reputation of each party to
the encounter for peace and quiet is admissible as tending to show who was the probable
aggressor . . ."
17. Strong v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 98, 287 S.W. 235 (1926); State v. Padula, 106
Conn. 454, 138 At]. 456 (1927); See also People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 408, 70 N.E. 1
(1904), where the court in a homicide case where the plea was self-defense, refused to
admit proof of the general reputation of the deceased for violence in order to show that
deceased was the aggressor because "if competent for that purpose, similar evidence could
be given as to the reputation of the defendant, as bearing on the probability that he was the
aggressor."
18. 1 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §63, p. 472 (3rd ed. 1940).
19. Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 443 (1950).
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ticularly in a homicide case, is relevant.20 Similarly, evidencing such char-
acter by placing in evidence specific acts of misconduct which exhibit
the particular trait involved conforms to the requirement of relevance.2 1
Why, then, are there rules of exclusion? If relevance were the only criteria
for admissability, no satisfactory answer could be given. Additional consid-
erations enter into the problem. It is said that these rules of character
exclusion are founded upon "the policy of avoiding the uncontrollable
and undue prejudice and possible unjust condemnation, which such evidence
might induce." 22 If the bad character of a defendant were initially admis-
sable, there would be an "overstrong tendency to believe the defendant
guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts,
and a tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the pres-
ent charge, but because he has escaped punishment from other offenses." 2 3
There are additional reasons which operate to exclude particular acts of
misconduct to evidence the character of the defendant, among which is the
"injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that
the attacking evidence is fabricated."
'24
Concisely stated, then, the auxiliary policy principles of undue preju-
dice,25 unfair surprise,26 and to a lesser extent, confusion of issues,
27
are at the foundation of these exclusionary rules of evidence. In the
abstract one may agree with both the rules and their rationale.2 8 Faced
with a factual situation where a defendant in a homicide case pleads self-
defense, and then proceeds to attack the character of his victim for
turbulence and violence in order to show which of them was the probable
aggressor, the issue squarely presents itself: may the prosecution make
similar inquiry into the same limited traits of character which the defendant
has attacked on the part of the deceased? Are the considerations here
precisely the same as in any case where the prosecution seeks to attack
the character of a defendant before he has put it in issue?
Although Wigmore vigorously defends the exclusionary rule and its
20. To the effect that a defendant's bad character is essentially relevant yet initially
inadmissible. See: People v. White, 24 Wend. 574 (1840); People v. Shea, 147 N.Y. 78,
41 N.E. 508 (1895) ; People v. Collins, 265 App. Div. 756, 40 N.Y. Supp. 2d 675 (1st Dep't
1943); State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W. 2d 723 (1947); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §55
(3rd ed. 1940).
21. People v. Diaz, 61 P.R.R. 873 (1943); Mager v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 245
(1945) ; Dennison v. State, 17 Ala. App. 674, 88 So. 211 (1921); Regina v. Shrimpton, 2
Den. C. C. 322 (1851); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §193 (3rd ed. 1940).
22. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §57, p. 454 (3rd ed. 1940).
23. 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §194 (3rd ed. 1940).
24. Ibid.
25. State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300, 12 Pac. 441 (1887); Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89,
94 N.W. 771 (1903); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIM-
INAL EVIDENCE §330 (11th ed. 1935) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1904 (3rd ed. 1940).
26. Kirby v. State, 182 Tenn. 16, 184 S.W. 2d 41 (1944) ; State v. Linhardt, 198 La. 182,
3 So. 2d 552 (1941); People v. Mangano, 375 Ill. 72, 30 N.E. 2d 428 (1940); State v.
Miller, 60 Idaho 79, 88 P. 2d 526 (1939) ; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1849 (3rd ed. 1940).
27. Wigmore contends that as a reason for character exclusion the principle of confusion
of issues is not a vital one because of the fac that extrinsic testimony could be excluded
and proof could be had by a record of prior conviction, or by cross-examination where the
defendant has waived his privilege by taking the witness stand: 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §194
(3rd ed. 1940) ; But see, Kehoe v. State, 194 Miss. 339, 12 So. 2d 149 (1943); People v.
Farricchia, 266 App. Div. 667, 40 N.Y. Supp. 2d 154 (2d Dep't 1943) ; State v. Barton, 198
Wash. 268, 88 P. 2d 385 (1939).
28. Even the dissenting judge in Roberson v. State conceded this: "The majority opinion
goes to great length in explaining the recognized rule, with which I find no fault as a gen-
eral proposition, but does not adequately give consideration to the exception . . ." Rober-
son v. State, - Okla. Cr. -, 218 P. 2d 414, 425 (1950).
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policy considerations, he agrees with the "Missouri rule" by way of an excep-
tion to the general rule of character exclusion. Wigmore states that "If the
deceased's character for peaceableness has thus been introduced by the de-
fendant, the same principle would then justify the prosecution (plaintiff) in
introducing the defendant's character for violence by way of exception to the
[general] rule. "29
In State v. Padula,3 0 where the issue of self-defense was raised on a trial
for homicide, the court refused to admit evidence of the character of
the deceased for violence in order to prove who was the aggressor chiefly
on the grounds that "If a violent disposition is to be given probative force
in determining who was the aggressor, it is logically as applicable to the
accused as to the decased." 31 Dean Wigmore's comment on this case and
its reasoning was " . . . but why not let it be offered, on the principle
that the accused has invoked the issue? Certainly, in lay experience, these
two items of evidence are always looked for."32
Those who would invoke the exception to the ordinary rule of character
exclusion, termed the "Missouri rule," stress the apparent fairness of it,
and the "justice and wisdom" of the principle.33 To them, "impartial
justice cannot be dispensed by allowing one litigant to present a given
type of evidence bearing upon an ultimate factual issue while at the same
time denying to his adversary the right to present his version of said issue
by evidence of equally inherent quality.' 34  At any rate, they argue,
"the initiative is with the defendant, which is an asset in any contest and
still clothes him with advantages over the state." . . ."If he has a past
so fraught with violence as to create the possibility that he would be
seriously prejudiced in the eyes of a jury and not receive a fair trial, he
can by-pass the subject.'
' 5
The advocates of this novel exception to the general exclusionary rule
have indulged in a kind of reasoning which if accepted will seriously
endanger the right of a defendant to an impartial trial.8 6 A defendant in
pleading self-defense is obviously vitally interested and concerned with
proving that his victim was the aggressor. To subject him consequently
to an attack on his character may indeed be relevant, but might nevertheless
prove highly prejudicial. 37 Moreover, if the attack were not confined to
his general reputation, but embraced in addition specific acts of misconduct
29. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §63, p. 472 (3rd ed. 1940) ; In support of his argument, Wig-
more cites as judicial authority: Stiles v. Lile, 203 Ky. 225, 262 S.W. 18 (1924) (civil action
for assault and battery; reputation of each litigant for peace and quietude held admissible
on issue of who was the aggressor) ; Strong v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 132, 282 S.W. 235
(1926) (manslaughter; court indicated that the defendant's bad character ought equally to
be receivable, after the deceased's character has been shown, but concludes that prior rulings
of the jurisdiction forbid this).
30. Supra note 17.
31. State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 456, 138 At. 456, 458 (1927).
32. 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §63, p. 472 and n. 1 (3rd ed. 1940).
33. Roberson v. State, __ Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 439 (1950).
34. State v. Robinson, 344 Mo. 1094, 1095, 130 S.W. 2d 530, 531 (1939).
35. Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. _ 218 P. 2d 414, 443 (1950).
36. ". . . to follow the Missouri rule would plunge us into an extended experimentation
relative to a rule of evidence tested in the crucibles of centuries of time and designed to
protect the rights of the accused." Roberson v. State, - Okla. Cr. , 218 P. 2d 414, 422
(1950).
37. "We can visualize many instances, under the proof where the defendant would be
entitled to be exonerated on tho charge as laid in the information, and yet become the
victim of the jury's general antipathy towards him." Roberson v. State, 218 P. 2d 414, 423
(1950).
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alleged to have occured on his part,38 a new and serious element of con-
fusion would result. Trials might degenerate into "boards of inquisition," 39
and the defendant might easily fall victim to the jury's general antipathy
towards him. Viewed in the light of our present fallible jury system,
already overburdened with subjective emphasis, the "Missouri rule" might
prove deadly to a defendant with a questionable reputation in his com-
munity or a reputation for violence. The issue in the trial of a criminal
case is singular: "Did the defendant commit the crime charged?" and
not ". . . has the defendant the reputation of having committed the
crime charged, or some similar crime? '"40 Moreover, a procedure which
would have a defendant answer for past maledictions may easily be con-
strued as contrary to the fundamental rule of criminal pleading, that in
an indictment charging a single offense, the issue must be confined to such
offense,4 1 and as a violation of the constitutional requirement that the
accused shall be informed of the accusation he shall be required to meet.
4 2
Legislation is perhaps the obvious answer to those who would change
the existing rules.4 3 It has already made substantial inroads upon the
exclusionary rule of character, particularly in the form of habitual criminal
acts.&4 4 Those who would defend the legal principle of a defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence may well fear any doctrine that seeks to condemn
him on collateral issues. Also, the prosecution is already sufficiently armed
with other legal though devious means by which a defendant's character
may be attacked.
4 5
38. The original exception to the rule of character exclusion as enunciated in the
Robinson case would apparently be confined to evidence of the general reputation of the
defendant for violence. It would probably not permit evidence of specific acts of tur-
bulence on his part. But the dissenting judge in the Roberson case felt that after the
defendant had attacked the general reputation of his victim, the state should then be per-
mitted to ". . . show the reputation of the accused for the same traits of character by
showing his general reputation in the community in which he lives for such traits, or
• . . by showing specific incidents if it can be shown that the deceased had knowledge
of such incidents, and providing that defendant sought to show specific incidents of which
he had knowledge prior to the homicide." Roberson v. State, 218 P. 2d 414, 442 (1950).
This view suggests an unwarranted extension of the original exception as promulgated in
the Robinson case.
39. Roberson v. State, 218 P. 2d 414, 423 (1950).
40. Munson v. State, 23 Okla. Cr. 64, 212 P. 438 (1923).
41.- United States v. Mitchell, 2 DalI. 348 (1795); State v. Bates, 10 Conn. 372 (1834);
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §194 (3rd ed. 1940).
42. U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
43. "If the legislature finds the rule of evidence herein involved out-moded as a vehicle
of justice, they may change the same by laying down a new and different rule." Roberson
v. State, 218 P. 2d 414, 423 (1950).
44. Under modern legislation for habitual criminals, the tribunal is authorized to increase
the sentence of one whose offense when established is found to be the second or a later
offense of the sort. Theoretically, proof of the prior offense for that purpose does not
militate against the rule forbidding the use of prior misconduct to evidence character. Some
of the state statutes, however, permit the fact of a prior conviction to be considered by the
jury before verdict: ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §602 (1949), upheld in People v. Lawrence, 390
II1. 499, 61 N.E. 2d 361 (1945) ; CoL. STAT. c. 114, §3 (1945); An additional legislative
example creating a decisive change in the ordinary rule of character exclusion is the Illinois
Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act, ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §820 et seq. (1949). Act approved
July 6, 1938. Its provisions declare admissible ". . . the commission by the said person of any
number of crimes, together with whatever punishments if any were inflicted." ILL. REV.
STAT. c. 38, §824 (1949). See also the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61-62 Vict., c. 36
§1; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§194a, 194b, 194c, 196 (3rd ed. 1940).
45. There are numerous purposes for which the prosecution is permitted to introduce
proof of similar crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendant: (1) to complete
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